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3A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT FROM 1980 TO 1990
INTRODUCTION
In the UK, the role of the state in accounting regulation has been ambivalent for some
decades. On the one hand, confidence has been openly expressed in the system of
private sector accounting regulation1 while accounting standards have been granted
legitimacy through recognition in company law2. On the other hand government has
introduced some detailed regulation through company law and has always been
involved in both the institutions and processes of private sector regulation. This
involvement has not necessarily been passive, but has always been covert leading to
reports of threats of counter-action by the government on some specific issues
(Robson).   Indeed, it is felt that fear of intervention by the government provides some
of the rationale for private sector regulation. (Bromwich, 1981, Sharp, 1971, Taylor
and Turley, 1986). Providing a sharp contrast to the UK government’s actions
towards the standard setting body, the sunshine policy of the Financial Accounting
standards Board (FASB) in the US, means that governmental influence is overt
whether in the area of a single issue or the future of the FASB (Beresford).
The role that government in the UK plays in the development of accounting standards
in the private sector, is defined by the areas in which the state becomes involved with
published accounting reports. The study contained in this paper identifies three roles
that the state assumes in respect of such reports. The state may be a preparer of
similar information, it may be a user of information and it may see regulation as
falling within its’ function of governing. There may however be some overlap in that
actions taken while assuming one role may be influenced by considerations of other
roles.
 Those regulations and practices that apply to business organisations are not legally
binding on government departments and agencies acting as preparers of accounting
information. However the very fact that both  are carrying out an activity called
accounting, must presume some degree of commonality in operation. The presence of
professionally trained accountants in departments and agencies ensures a degree of
diffusion of ideas, and recent moves away from traditional cash-based accounting by
the government, makes this diffusion of practice more significant.
                                                
1 See for example Hansard Vol.182 and Vol.183.
2 Companies Act 1989
4The second role of government is that of a user of accounting information. Users of
corporate reports are defined by the Corporate Report as;
‘those having a reasonable right to information concerning the reporting
entity......a reasonable right to such information exists where the activities of an
organisation impinge or may impinge of a user group’   
  (ASSC  1975 p. 17)
The appendix to this paper compares the findings of the research in this chapter with
the government’s uses of corporate reports suggested by that document.
The final role is that of the state as a regulator of accounting in its own right. Since
the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, the state has, through successive  Companies
Acts, assumed more and more responsibility for regulating accounting rather than
allowing it to be a matter of private contract between companies and users3.
Nevertheless, since 1970 its responsibilities have been ‘shared’ with a private sector
regulatory body. Not only have prescriptive rules grown within company law, but an
increasing number of standards have been developed, to a great extent by the
accounting profession itself. The regulatory role taken on by the state could be
influenced by its’ perception of best practice in respect of its' preparer role, by its'
needs as a user or through the realisation that economic consequences may achieve
policy objectives.
APPROACH OF THIS STUDY
 In order to  understand part of the complex relationship existing between the state
and the private sector, a study was made of the reasons for state interest in published
accounting information and the way in which  interaction with the regulatory process
takes place. Interviews were held with representatives of several governmental
departments and agencies which were identified as using published accounting
information4. During each interview the government official was asked how they used
published accounting information.  From the results it was possible to ascertain and
categorise some of the underlying relationships between agencies or departments and
reporting entities which identified the government’s information needs. These
relationships are specified in a later section of this paper. Most of the examples given,
represent activities which are still current, although earlier examples have also been
                                                
3 As the situation in the 19th century is described by Edey and Panitpakdi (1956)
4 The research was carried out in 1990 and reflected the structure, functions and operating environment
of government and agencies at around that time.
5included as illustrations. Where, in a decisional context additional information is
used, this has also been specified, in that both non-published and non-accounting
information can act as a surrogate for published accounting information.  The uses
detailed are not an exhaustive list due to the complex structure and diverse
responsibilities of major government departments, but rather represent substantive
examples, in order to provide a categorisation of the various uses rather than to
examine decisional and informational aspects in depth.
The results of these interviews indicate something of the perceived interest that the
state has in published accounts.  An appreciation of the role as a preparer of financial
information arose as a by-product of questions asked as to the user function.  The
results of this aspect have not been taken further in this paper, as the adoption of those
practices seen as desirable by the state is beyond the scope of this work5.  The role
played by the Department of Trade and Industry6 (DTI, formerly Department of
Trade, DoT) in accounting rule-making ensures that there is an on-going mechanism
in place for transferring accounting technology from the business to the government
sector, (although no evidence was found of technology transferring in the other
direction).
The determination of the role of government can also be illustrated by drawing on two
other sources of interaction between the government and the accounting standard
setters.  Firstly, there are the comment letters written by government departments in
response to Exposure Drafts which may indicate a policy perspective. These comment
letters represent the overt view of government towards an issue and their content
could provide evidence of possible motives for the involvement of government in the
standard setting process. Government Departments, especially the DTI have been
fairly active in responding with comments. These replies have been analysed and
categorised in order to discover the motives of the State in attempting to effect
accounting change and to compare such motives with its' user role.  Where not
seeking its own direct interest as a user, it may be assumed that a Department is acting
in another interest.  This interest may be political, either following a proscribed policy
objective or following a general notion of the public interest (which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive goals).  Additionally, since the archives of the
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) have been made available for research, it
has been possible to examine further interaction by the  DTI with the ASC, through
records of meetings and correspondence. Although many papers have been removed
                                                
5  Generally the research indicated that the government adopted those practices and methods it saw as
applicable, while rejecting those it saw as inapplicable or undesirable.
6  As an observer on both the ASC and ASB.
6as being confidential7, more input into the standard setting process than is publicly
acknowledged may be implied.  The two topics specifically addressed in the context
of this research, relate to the development of the goodwill and the foreign exchange
standard during the 1980’s, which represent two substantive examples of government
interaction with the accounting standard setting body.
THE USER ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
From the results of these interviews, many government departments and agencies  are
confirmed as users of published accounting information.  Within a department,
different sections may have different requirements based on their individual roles.
The information requirements of these departments or sections depend upon the
relationship between the reporting entity and the government department.   The  study
identified five distinct relationships as follows:
• There is the trading type of relationship where the Department is a
purchaser of goods or services.
• There is the grant relationship where public funds are made available
to organisations usually under a Statutory Instrument set up under Act
of Parliament.
• In order to ensure compliance with the law, the Government may use
published accounting information as a way of monitoring actions e.g.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission.
• Where departments are not necessarily interested in specifics,
accounting data may be used to gain an overview of the organisation.
• There is the relationship based on taxation and the organisation either
from the point of view of direct taxes levied e.g. Corporation Tax or
from the point of view of the organisation as a collection agent for
taxes e.g. Value Added Tax.
In many cases, published information is not sufficient to satisfy requirements, and
other non-published information has to be supplied.  The basis for the supply of
information not normally in the public domain, lies in the nature of the relationship.
This additional information may be secured by legal enforcement, as a condition of
the relationship, or through an industry agreement, entered into voluntarily, but
binding on all parties.
                                                
7  No reason is given for the removal of these papers apart from the fact that they were deemed
‘confidential’. Unfortunately, due to the way in which the archive is kept, it is not possible to ascertain
their subject matter.
7Wherever a trading relationship exists, then additional information is either supplied
voluntarily or through a collective industry agreement (which in many ways is an
extension of voluntary supply).  When giving grants, Departments are able to exact
the price of additional information as a condition for the grant, either before it is made
or afterwards to ensure it has been properly used. In most cases of relationships based
on legal compliance, powers exist to secure any additional information. Taxation, not
surprisingly, is backed up by specific powers granted under the law to enable
sufficient information to be supplied for the correct tax charge to be made. The
exception in the area of legal compliance is in respect of employee involvement,
which might indicate a lack of commitment to this area of social policy. Where a
general overview is required there are no additional powers to secure information.
The table which follows, illustrates the types of relationship mentioned above and
links these to government departments. It also specifies which departments use other
information and classifies the grounds under which that information is supplied.
8Insert Table 1 here.
9Overall, it would appear that user needs of Government Departments are satisfied by
published accounts, albeit supplemented by other information, supplied through the
relationship of the Department with the reporting entity.  During the course of the
interviews, only one Department (Office of Fair Trading) expressed a need for more
information than was presently available.  The Office in fact was one of the few
Departments apart from the DTI, making its own comments to the ASC.
If, therefore, the majority of Departments are already satisfied as far as information
needs are concerned, the role of the DTI in replying to Exposure Drafts would not
appear to be that of securing decision-useful or performance monitoring information
on behalf of those Departments by demanding better disclosure or alternative
measurement approaches.  Their own perception of their role is detailed later in this
paper and compared with their 'public face' in making replies to Exposure Drafts as
well as their actions in the regulatory process, as evidenced by the ASC archives.
GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO EXPOSURE DRAFTS
The replies to Exposure Drafts made by government departments and agencies from
1980 to 1990 have been analysed.  The starting point has been chosen for two reasons.
Following the change of government in 1979, any new policy effects should have
been impounded into Exposure Draft replies by that time.  1980 also marks the year
before the EC 4th Directive was incorporated into UK law through the Companies
Act of 1981.  Thus any effects of anticipating provisions of the Act should have been
incorporated into both the Exposure Drafts and the replies. The final year marks the
end of the ASC and the formation of the ASB8
Between 1980 and 1990 twenty Exposure Drafts were issued, on which comment
letters are available.  Of these, government departments have commented publicly on
all but three (ED 27, Foreign Exchange, ED 39, Pension Costs and  ED 47,
Goodwill).   With the exception of these, the Department of Trade and Industry have
commented on all but one (ED 38, Charities) which was commented on by the Home
Office.  Other Departments involved in comment letters are the Inland Revenue (ED
40, Stocks and Long Term Contracts) and the Office of Fair Trading and the Central
Statistical Office (both ED 45, Segmental Reporting).  Although the latter office was
responsible to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, nevertheless, their
                                                
8 And the end of the availability of archival material from the standard setting body, as only the ASC
allowed access to its’ files.
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submission was made independently. A summary of the comments made is included
in Appendix 2.
The general pattern of replies with the predominance of the DTI would confirm the
views expressed by the departments interviewed that they would normally submit
their views, if any, through the DTI. The exceptions to this appear to have occurred
where matters of extreme relevance to the department in question are under
discussion, or possibly where the views of the department were different from the
DTI.
An analysis of the content of comment letters,  suggests five main categories of
replies:
•    economic policy   
•    technical
•    compliance with law
•    compliance with international standards
•    additional disclosure
Where a reply relates to any of these areas, the substance of such a reply may be either
to endorse the Draft or suggest a change.  No differentiation has been made in the
analysis between these two approaches since they are both indicative of the
government's motives in concerning itself with accounting regulation. Exposure
Drafts leading to Statements of Recommended Practice (SORPs) have been included
as well as those leading to SSAPs since the same consideration will apply to both the
limited sphere of the former as well as the fundamental issues raised by the latter.
Certain Exposure Drafts appear to have drawn any comments directly referring to
areas of economic policy9.  Those which have, include the leasing standard (ED 29)
where the concern of the DTI centred on the possible effects of the standard on the
'willingness or ability of companies to invest in productive assets' (DTI, 4.5.82) and
segmental reporting (ED 45) where it was felt that due to the consequence of
disclosure of results by separate economic activities 'markets will function more
efficiently and competition will be encouraged' (OFT  2.5.89). There is an emphasis
                                                
9 Economic consequences literature would imply that all accounting proposals will have some effect.
Robson’s (1988) research identified in the context of the Sandilands Committee, four ‘arenas’,
Industrial Relations, Counter-Inflation Policy, Industrial Policy and Taxation, in which accounting and
the economic environment were intertwined.
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on exempting small companies from compliance on four separate occasions, EDs 29,
32, 45 and 46.  This presumably would be in accordance with government policy
concerning the encouragement of small businesses10. However, on nine occasions, the
appeal by the government has been for more disclosure. This has been separately
categorised, even though such disclosure may generally be felt to increase the
decision-usefulness of accounting reports.  Part of the motivation for this request
could be from the perspective of the state as a user in its own right, but as seen
previously, this is not necessarily the case as government appears by nature of its
external relationships with enterprises to receive its own set of decision-useful
information. A possible reason could be the state promotion of economic efficiency
(and welfare of the user groups) through allowing optimal decisions to be made with
the help of increased disclosure11.
The majority of replies have included comments of a technical nature (classified as
‘Clarification of Detail’).  This is not surprising given the technical content of Drafts
and the fact that the communication is in many cases between accountant and
accountant.  Although all comments tend to be in the realms of the technical, this
specific categorisation covers such areas as clarification, explanation, minor drafting
changes, expansion of detail or suggestions as to alternative treatments.
Compliance with UK law (including clarification and suggested alignment of terms
used) refers not only to UK Company Law, but also to company law practice as
opposed to proscribed detail.  This is an area where the DTI appear to be extremely
active (commenting on 11 occasions), even though when interviewed they claim this
as being a fairly minor role in their examination of exposure drafts.  However, major
conflicts between standards and the law in the past e.g. SSAP 4 and SSAP 9 have led
to revisions to the standards.
Compliance with International Standards have been mentioned on three occasions
(ED’s 32, 43 and 45).  It may appear somewhat paradoxical that the government is
reminding the standard setters (who are largely drawn from the accounting profession)
to incorporate regulations developed by the profession on an international basis.
Although this aspect has not been explored further in this paper, this might be an
acknowledgement of the possible role of international standards in the process of
harmonisation of European Law.
                                                
10 See for example the Conservative Party Manifestos of 1979 and 1983.
11 Stocks and Harrell (1995) equate increase in the level of accounting information with better
decisions, although they concluded that groups benefit more than individuals.
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The following table summarises the areas into which government's replies to
Exposure Drafts fall;
13
   Analysis of government replies to exposure drafts 1980 to 1990.
Insert Table 2 here
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THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ROLE OF THE DTI
The Department of Trade and Industry was one of two Government Departments with
representation on the ASC12   (the Companies Division of the Department had
observer status).  Within the process of standard setting, the Division saw its role as
two-fold13.  The first of these was to communicate and sound out the views of other
departments.  This was carried out by way of forwarding exposure drafts to most
departments for comments.  Although departments were invited to reply, the process
appeared in practice to be one of communicating information rather than securing
replies.  In addition, the DTI looked at all replies to Exposure Drafts (subject to time)
and could have sought advice from other departments or the Bank of England on
specialist matters.
The Department's second involvement with standard setting was concerned with
compliance with the law, but the perception of the DTI is that this was a minor role.
They ensured by their involvement in the process of standard-setting, that standards
complied with the Companies Act.  At times, they were  represented and operated
within any working group of the standard-setting body involved with legal matters14.
The Companies Division claimed, however, that it devoted most of its resources to
matters of developing Company Law, rather than involving itself with accounting
standards.
Much of the involvement of the DTI with the ASC took place at meetings where the
minutes do not appear in the ASC archives; nevertheless there are many references to
the involvement of the Companies Division at various meetings of sub-groups.
During the development of the foreign exchange standard, Jenkins, of the Companies
Division attended the discussion meeting held on 14.11.79 with some 42
representatives of major companies (ASC 2/8/6).  Influence by the DTI did seem to
occur in that their acceptance of  elements of the standard seemed to be important to
the ASC. It is recorded in the minutes of a meeting on 21.1.83, that:
'The ASC representatives explained how they had dealt with the individual
comments made by the DOT15 in the attachment to their letter (dated 10.1.83) and
this treatment was accepted by the DOT subject to the following minor
amendments...'
                                                
12 And subsequently on the ASB
13 Source - interview with Jenkins of DTI on 19.10.90.
14 Where changes in company law are to be made, the DTI produces consultative documents on which
it invites comments by specific dates in much the same way as exposure drafts. These documents are
forwarded to those parties considered by the Department to have an interest in the topic.
15 Department of Trade, now DTI.
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(ASC 1/9/1)
Unfortunately no record of the letter of 10.1.83 has been retained, but the element of
negotiation is confirmed in a letter from Pauline Wallace, (under secretary to the
ASC) to J Bowman of Price Waterhouse dated 28.1.83 'In addition to the changes
agreed with the DOT...' (ASC 2/11/2, italics added). The importance of alignment of
standards with company law did appear to have been accepted some three years
earlier in a letter from Jenkins (DOT) to Carty (ASC secretary) dated 7.5.80:
'At the very least, it will be assumed that compliance with an SSAP would not
involve any risk of infringing the statutory requirements......we think it
important that the ASC should consider the treatment advocated in the
proposed exposure draft in the light of the imminent and prospective statutory
position in the UK'
(ASC 2/30/2)
The development of the standard on goodwill, also showed the involvement of the
Department. A panel was set up as a sub-committee of the ASC to discuss matters
relating to goodwill with Knox and Leeson of the DOT as members. Although
minutes only exist in respect of one meeting, mention is made of 8 meetings of this
panel between November 1978 and June 1979 (ASC 2/10/2). Evidence of
negotiations on the terms of the proposed standard exists. In a letter dated 10.9.79
from Knox to Wild of the ASC he stated;
' ... I suggest that in order to maintain comparability where goodwill is carried
as a permanent asset, the effect of the treatment we now recommend should be
disclosed in the notes'
(ASC 2/10/2)
Comment letters on the exposure draft were sent to Knox, which confirms the
statement made by the DTI during an interview with the writer that these are
examined whenever time permits. Knox was also asked to check details of the legality
of the proposed treatments with his legal staff (minutes of meeting of panel ASC
2/24/1), a function which the DOT later repeated through a letter from Jenkins (DOT)
to Renshall (ASC) dated 26.5.82 commenting on the reconciliation of the proposed
standard with the law and additionally commenting on matters of drafting (ASC
2/89/1). The Department of Trade comment letter on ED 30 which was publicly
available  starts with the words ‘Since we in this Department were closely involved in
the formulation of ED 30, Accounting for Goodwill, you are probably not expecting
us to comment much further.’ (letter to ASC dated 7th April 1983)
16
The extent of government involvement can also be seen through records of
Parliamentary answers. In 1976 in the context of inflation accounting, Dell, Minister
at  the Treasury stated that ,
'Government have been consulted by the accounting profession in
course of preparation of the exposure draft, and endorse the approach
taken by the profession.'
(Hansard Vol. 921)
The DTI not only monitored developments in the area of accounting regulation16 , but
also were pro-active on occasions as John Redwood (Secretary of  State for Trade and
Industry) also stated;
'My Department has drawn the attention of the ASB to several points
which will need to be considered when SSAP 21 is reviewed.'
( Hansard Vol. 194  9.7.91)
However, the DTI had stated that their role with regard to accounting standards was
one of communication of information to other departments and receiving their
comments whilst ensuring compliance with company law was a secondary role. The
incidences of other departments responding to exposure drafts was very rare, and it is
therefore difficult in the absence of the availability of inter-departmental
correspondence to ascertain the amount of communication that may have taken place
or the origin of governmental (DOT/DTI) replies to exposure drafts. In interviews
with other departments, no recollection was forthcoming of comments on exposure
drafts being given to the DTI. This might imply that it was only the DTI themselves
who are concerned with accounting standards although during an interview with the
writer they tended to marginalise their involvement. This 'official' attitude is
confirmed in a letter written by Miss E Llewellyn-Smith, Under Secretary of the
Companies Division on 10.8.82 to M Walsh, Head of Technical Services at the
Association of Certified and Corporate Accountants (ACCA) stating 'Still less would
I feel it the Department's role to say whether a standard should or should not apply to
banks' (ASC 2/28/2). The title of 'observer 'on the ASC would imply a passive role if
it were not for the fact that evidence exists that on one occasion they voted on a draft
standard17. (Letter from K Sharp to K Robinson of ASC dated 21.4.82, ASC 2/29/3).
                                                
16  This may be illustrated by a reply made by Redwood of the DTI to Austen Mitchell MP, on the
subject of accounting for financial futures, in which he stated that the issue was being considered by the
profession and that the DTI was watching developments closely (Hansard Vol. 194).
17 This was explained by a former assistant secretary of the ASC as purely a way in which the ASC
could confirm the agreement of government to the draft standard, although presumably implies that
ASC were concerned about official opinion. In any case it does elevate the position of 'observer' and
give government a higher profile than other groups (Interview with J Winters, 1995).
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It is not possible to say whether they voted on other occasions as the ballot results
were normally disclosed only on a numerical basis.
Consultation by the ASC with the DOT was a normal part of their process of
developing draft standards. This is accounted for in an internal paper produced by the
ASC in 1982, which stated;
' Because of the growing impact of company law on accounting, it has become
necessary to consult frequently with the Companies Division of the Department of
Trade when exposure drafts of new standards or revisions of existing standards have
reached an appropriate stage'
(ASC 1982)
Despite the role described above which would appear to be one of reconciling
standards with the law, there were however concerns voiced at the involvement of the
DTI. In an internal memo from Rawlins to Davison prior to the latter’s Chairmanship
of the ASC, excess government interference from their representatives was mentioned
(ASC 5/3/5, dated 25.5.82).
CONCLUSION
The motivation for state involvement in standard setting would appear to exclude
their own role as a user.  Where representatives of user groups are members of or
attempt to influence standard setting bodies, their actions will generally be dictated by
the requirements of information as inputs to decision models.  In the case of
government departments and agencies, their needs appear to be satisfied either by
existing reporting practices or through their powers both formal and informal to
secure additional information.
Involvement in the standard setting process, if not carried out from the user
perspective, must have other reasons.  One might be the promotion of specific policy
objectives; another might be the 'public interest' aspect of maximising social welfare
(although there must be a degree of overlap between these two objectives).  In the
case of the former, some specific policies are recognisable e.g. the concern with
exempting small companies from some reporting requirements and the effect of
reporting leased items as fixed assets with corresponding liabilities.  In the case of
'public interest' the link is more tenuous.  More disclosure may be associated with
improving the allocative process through superior decision-making.  Clarification of
technical matters might also assist with this.  The interest of the state in accounting
would not appear to be a passive role of allowing reports to influence their decision
18
making behaviour.  It seems that the role is far more one of ensuring desirable results
from accounting (from the point of view of the government).
 It is difficult to imagine the state allowing the formulation of regulations with
economic effects taking place outside the normal policy-making arena unless they can
exert a degree of influence.  The emphasis on compliance of standards with UK law is
one area in which the state is exercising an overall control.  The lack of detailed
accounting rules made  by the state would appear to indicate the acceptance of a
framework under which the accounting profession makes these detailed rules, whilst
remaining  within the boundaries set by the Companies Acts.  However, detailed rules
have economic effects, and it is these that the state may attempt to control.  Certainly
the observer status of the government representatives on the Accounting Standards
Committee appears to hide the influence they were able to wield.  Not only does the
state have the ability to institutionalise the process of standard-setting totally, but is
able to influence individual issues.  In the context of the revision to the Research and
Development standard;
'.....the DTI observer commented that the government was keen to see the
disclosure of Research and Development expenditure in the standard, but was
considering the use of a statutory instrument to require disclosure, if the ASC could
not agree on a suitable standard' (Robson, 1988 p. 64)
The covert side of state pressure does not appear within the replies to exposure drafts,
which tend to state a view rather than threaten action. The real pressure may be
perceived by the accounting profession determined to maintain the setting of
accounting standards in the private sector, yet who operate in an environment in
which accounting standards and the law are irretrievably entwined. The very nature of
accounting rules and the economic consequences they introduce, implies that the
relationship between the standard setters and the government will never represent a
total system of delegation even within a framework.
19
APPENDIX 1
 GOVERNMENT AS A USER AND THE CORPORATE REPORT
The Corporate Report mentions specifically that the interest of Government in
published accounts of companies is as follows;
'.....information to estimate the effects of existing and proposed levies
and other financial and economic measures...... to estimate economic
trends including likely balance of payments figures.
....to promote economic efficiency.... as a potential or existing
customer or finance creditor'
 (para 2.33)
The findings of this paper are consistent with some of the above statements in
that the work of the Central Statistical Office provides a basis for economic
estimates.  Certainly the Treasury has expressed an interest in the economic
implications of accounting standards while the Department of Trade and
Industry has demonstrated this by their replies to Exposure Drafts under the
heading of economic policy in the analysis (which may be assumed to include
the promotion of efficiency).  Government's role as a potential customer or
finance creditor is illustrated in the sections on the Department of the
Environment, Department of Health, Home Office, Ministry of Agriculture
Fisheries and Food and the Ministry of Defence.  This supplier/customer role,
it may be assumed, would also apply to the majority of Departments as well as
those individually interviewed.
The Corporate Report continues with the uses of information as;
(a) Assessing the effectiveness of the entity in achieving objectives
established previously by society.
(b)Assessing the capacity of the entity to make future re-allocations of
its resources for social purposes.
(c) Evaluating the economic function and performance of the 
entity in relation to society and the national interest and the 
social costs and benefits attributable to the entity.
(d) Attesting to compliance with taxation regulations, company law,
contractual and other legal obligations and requirements'
(para 2.35)
With regard to section (a),  the activities of the Office of Fair Trading and the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, would appear to agree with this in
respect of economic policies and additionally the Employee Involvement
section of the Department of Employment would apply to an area of social
policy.  Sections (b) and (c) are extremely general and it may be assumed that
this use occurs through the overview of companies carried out by the
Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury.  Section (d) underlines
the function of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, whilst the
monitoring of obligations would appear to be a function carried out by all
Departments entering into contracts involving performance.
20
APPENDIX 2
REPLIES TO EXPOSURE DRAFT
EXTRACTS FROM GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS COMMENT
LETTERS 1980 to 1990
Department of Industry and Trade, Accountancy Services Division, 4th May
1982, Accounting for Leases and Hire Purchase Contracts.
'It would indeed be undesirable if the introduction of an accounting standard
adventitiously reduced the willingness or ability of companies to invest in productive
assets'
'We would also welcome the proposal in the exposure draft that small companies
would at least be permitted to adopt a simplified form of accounting...'
'It may therefore be considered preferable if separate captions were used, with the
caption for leased assets making it clear that the asset represented did not constitute
ownership rights but rights to the future benefits from use of the assets for the greater
part of their useful economic lives'
Department of Trade, 7th April 1983, Accounting for Goodwill
'Departure from this provision is required if following it would not give a true and
fair view (1948 Act, Section 149)
'Indeed, paragraph 19 of Schedule 8 to the 1948 Companies Act would seem to
require the write-down of shares only if there has been a diminuation in value.'
'Neither of these paragraphs reflect adequately the legal requirement which is stated
in Schedule 8, Note 3 to the balance sheet formats.'
'Under section 39(4) of the 1980 Companies Act any provision must be treated as a
realised loss and distributable profits would thereby be restricted.'
'It does not adequately reflect the position in law, that the holding company's
investment should be stated at purchase price, may only be written down if it is
diminished in value and must be written down if the diminuation is permanent
(Schedule 8, paragraphs 17-19).'
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Department of Trade, 7th April 1983, Acquisitions and Mergers.
'We would suggest that paragraphs 6 and 25 might be expanded to make it clear that
acquisition accounting is applied to pre-acquisition profits in respect of shares
acquired for non-equity consideration.'
'Neither covers all the disclosure requirements of the 1982 (Accounts and Audit)
Regulations...'.
Department of Trade, 5th December 1983, Disclosure of Pension Information,
ED 32.
'...this adds useful clarification and should be re-instated'
'It would seem useful, if the date of the most recent actuarial valuation is to be
disclosed, to have also the date of the next valuation or the frequency of the
valuations.'
'...we remain unconvinced that the disclosure recommended would comply with the
legal requirements in all circumstances.'
...it is far from certain that compliance with the proposed standard would ensure
compliance with paragraph 50(4) of schedule 8.'
'...but nevertheless feel that it might be useful if ED. 32 were to contain a note on how
far compliance with it is compatible with IAS 19.'
' "Small" companies which file modified accounts are not required to file the
information required to be given by paragraphs 50 and 56 of Schedule 8. It is not
clear what the position of the standard is, in relation to such companies: presumably
it is not intended to require them to disclose what the law permits them to withold.'
Department of Trade and Industry, November 1983, ED 33, Accounting for
Deferred Tax.
'We can see no justification for an exemption from the standard for wholly owned
subsidiaries, which are subject, as are all companies, to the requirements of Schedule
8 to the Companies Act 1948 as regards deferred tax.'
'We consider discounting of deferred tax liabilities should only be considered, if at
all, as part of a proposal in relation to all deferred liabilities and assets.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 8th November 1984, ED 34 Pension Scheme
Accounts
'To disclose only the net movement would show the net effect on the funds but to
disclose both gross figures would additionally give members an idea of investment
activity which at either extreme could be important.'
22
'We agree that all assets should be accounted for at market value but would suggest
that consideration should also be given to drawing attention in the SORP to material
change in the market value of assets between the year end and the date of approval by
the trustees as required by SSAP 17, Accounting for Post Balance Sheet Events.
Department of Trade and Industry, 5th July 1985, ED 36 Extraordinary  Items
and Prior Year Adjustments.
'There is nothing in company law to prevent this but equally there is nothing to
prevent the alternative treatment whereby the profit or loss on disposal would be
calculated by reference to the carrying amount of the asset in the balance sheet.'
'Paragraph 34 (1) of Schedule 4 provides that these deficits must be debited to
revaluation reserve, even if that reserve stands at zero.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 2nd October 1985, ED 37 Accounting for
Depreciation.
'We have no problems with the reference to the situation described in paragraph 25
(a), but would like to see an additional reference to the true and fair requirement
inserted here.'
Home Office, Voluntary Services Unit, 17th April 1986. Accounting by Charities.
'We should have liked to see a little more guidance in your recommendations on
sources and application of funds on the importance of distinguishing (and identifying)
public sources of funding.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 29th April 1987, ED 40 Stock and Long
Term Contracts.
'However in many cases we would expect that there would be a sufficient element of
uncertainty about the amount to make it a provision, as defined by Schedule 4 of the
Companies Act 1985 (CA 1985).'
Inland Revenue, Policy Division, 3rd April 1987, ED 40, Stock and Work in
Progress
'...we believe that paragraphs 1 to 5 of the statement will need some modification, and
I hope to write to the accountancy bodies in more detail...' (Note. This concerns the
proposed omission from the new standard of the Board of Inland revenue's statement
on the tax treatment of changes in the basis of the valuation of stocks and work in
progress.)
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Department of Trade and Industry, 19th November 1987, ED 41, Accounting for
Research and Development.
'In particular, we support the proposal to require disclosure of R & D charged as an
expense in the current year. It should make for greater awareness of R & D and of its
importance in assessing company performance.'
'As you know, our view of the law is that paragraph 20 of Schedule 4 to the
Companies Act is permissive and would allow companies to follow this policy.
Department of Trade and Industry, 2nd August 1988, ED 42, Accounting for
Special Purpose Transactions.
'We think that the ASC should give further consideration to the need to make it clear
in the proposed SSAP where it is simply elaborating on the statutory requirements of
the Companies Act 1985, and where the treatment it recommends is based on the use
of the true and fair override.
Department of Trade and Industry, 13th September 1988, ED 43, The
Accounting Treatment of Government Grants.
'It contravenes the fundamental accruals accounting concept on which paragraph 27
is based, without the justification of being required by the prudence concept.'
‘The government in setting the terms and conditions of a grant, and a company in
deciding whether to accept a grant, will usually take account of the standard. The
exception in paragraph 32 is more likely to complicate than help these decisions. We
note that IAS 20 does not have a similarly worded exception.’
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Department of Trade and Industry, November 1988, ED 44, Accounting for
Goodwill.
'This proposal, by providing for the disclosure of earnings per share (EPS), before
and after the amortisation charge, might reduce the disincentive to amortise and
might therefore increase the number of companies which amortise goodwill. Since
international accounting opinion is moving in favour of amortisation, this would
encourage UK accounting standards and practice to move in line with this trend.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 4th May 1989, ED 45, Segmental Reporting.
'Its implementation into a standard should help to improve the usefulness of company
accounts to users.'
'Many users of accounts would prefer to see segmentation by source but we are
constrained by the Fourth Directive and disclosure on both bases seems the
appropriate response.'
'In particular, we have in mind the inclusion of :-
-  treatment of the domestic market as a geographical segment (that is, the UK
or, perhaps, the British Isles),
- disclosure of depreciation taken into account in arriving at segment results
- disclosure of capital expenditure by segment.'
- 
'However, there are also other considerations which ought to be taken into account.
Government Departments make use of company accounts for statistical purposes. You
will no doubt be aware that some of the statistics dealing with the economy produced
by the Government has been criticised over the last few years and that action has
recently been announced by the Prime Minister to improve their quality. The
publication of the ED and the issue of a SSAP in due course could prove to be timely
in this context.
The use of company accounts information in the preparation of United Kingdom
national accounts suffers at present because of the absence of adequate segmental
data, in particular, a UK segment. Incorporation of sufficient information
requirements into the eventual SSAP would therefore be helpful in reducing other
reporting demands placed upon companies by Government.'
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Cabinet Office, Central Statistical Office, 26th April 1989, ED 45, Segmental
Reporting.
'If ED 45 is implemented in a suitable form, it should enable us to cut the number of
statistical forms sent to companies by Government and thereby greatly reduce the
burden of form-filling on businesses whilst improving the overall efficiency of data
compilation and the quality of macro-economic aggregates.'
'We would also like to see the addition of a requirement for geographical
segmentation (with the UK as a specified segment) of capital expenditure and
depreciation.'
Office of Fair Trading, 2nd May 1989, ED 45 Segmental Reporting
'...we feel that the primary requirement is to meet the information needs of
shareholders in assessing performance. Large conglomerate firms, in particular,
have the ability to.....conceal the performance of individual sectors from
shareholders.'
' We believe that segmental reporting should be aligned, as far as possible, with a
company's activities in separate economic markets. In this way, markets will function
more efficiently and competition will be encouraged.'
Department of Trade and Industry, 18th September 1989, ED 46, Related Party
Transactions
'We are concerned that no undue burdens should be placed upon companies and think
that the application of the proposed standard to small companies could impose a
reporting burden which is not fully justified....Therefore disclosure...by large
companies is more justifiable than in respect of small companies when such
information may be commercially damaging.'
'As a result of the support expressed by the UK for the objective of the IASC, any non-
compliance by the UK with IASC standards is likely to be given a higher profile than
hitherto.'
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Department of Trade and Industry, 31st July 1990, ED 48, Accounting for
Acquisitions and Mergers.
'..we think it would be preferable for the standard to use the same term as the Act.'
'...we think it would be useful if the section dealing with the legal requirements in
Great Britain were to be expanded to describe the requirements  of paragraphs 9,11
and 12 of the new Schedule 4A to the Companies Act 1985.'
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APPENDIX 3
 INTERVIEWS  WITH  DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
The Bank Of England
The Bank has no formal responsibility for collecting or maintaining data based on
company accounts, but has in the past used data supplied by the DTI to study the
influences on the profitability of companies, making adjustments for the effects of
inflation18. More recently, the Bank has used a commercial database in order to
monitor the performance of certain large individual companies with a view to
identifying cases where companies might find themselves in financial difficulties19.
This is not a statutory duty, but one that the Bank has taken on itself to help prevent
collapse of major industrial companies.  For this it has developed a Z-score model
from the evidence of company failures in the 1970's.  This model, incorporating a
small number of key financial ratios, is used to predict such failures.  Additionally,
the Bank has published a series of articles on the performance of large companies and
a study of the differences between performance and other ratios when measured using
historical and current cost bases.  Other studies carried out by the Bank have been on
the behaviour of companies in such areas as debt and dividend decisions, and the co-
existence of borrowing and increasing liquidity within individual companies.
For several years, the Bank has constructed aggregate statistics on the profitability of
industrial and commercial companies on behalf of the Review Board for Government
Contracts who use the data in constructing a profit formula for non-competitive
contracts (see Ministry of Defence section). The Bank did not appear to have any
direct input into the standard setting process, although the Governor of the Bank of
England now has joint responsibility for appointment of the directors of the Financial
Reporting Council (FRC).
The Central Statistical Office
Since the 1940's, the Central Statistical Office20 has compiled UK National Income
Accounts  (published annually as the ‘Blue Book’) which include balance sheets,
income and appropriation accounts and statements of sources and uses of funds for
various sectors of the economy.  These sectors consist of the public sector and the
private sector, which is divided into industrial and commercial companies, financial
                                                
18  This work was continued by the DTI itself.
19  This function had developed since the oil crisis of the 1970’s.
20 Now named Office for National Statistics.
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institutions and a residual category covering the activities of persons either as
individuals or in certain other forms of association.  For the most part, information
does not come only from published accounts, because national income accounts
generally measure activities within the national boundary whereas UK parents of
groups of companies may present consolidated statements which transcend these
boundaries and therefore adjustments are necessary. National Income Accounts use
gross profit as a reasonable surrogate figure for the net output of industrial and
commercial companies, but further adjustments have to be made in the case of
financial institutions which tend otherwise to give misleading results.  National
Income accounts are therefore compiled from a variety of sources, including banking
statistics collected by the Bank of England and the Board of Inland Revenue's
Corporation Tax assessments.  Published accounts provide information in such areas
as trade credit and company investment in central and local government securities,
which is not available from other sources The Central Statistical Office used
information from company accounts to check the National Income Accounts estimates
it has received from other sources.  This was done by use of the Business Monitor
(MA3) produced formally by the Department of Trade and Industry21.
Department of the Environment (Housing)
Under Section 156 of the Housing Act 1985, local authorities could sell property to
the private sector.  Where the sale was subject to a mortgage, the  Department of the
Environment had to approve the lender where the sale was at a discount.  Such
approval depended upon the financial strength of the  lender and conditions could be
imposed to improve any apparent deficiencies in the relationship between equity and
debt. The practice of securitisation of mortgages caused problems in that these
mortgages disappeared from the balance sheet, but were still managed by the original
lender. The Department at times therefore demanded additional non-published data in
order to grant approval to potential lenders22.
Additionally, under Section 73 of the Housing Act 1985 the Department makes grants
to voluntary organisations e.g. Shelter.  These grants are targeted for specific areas
and therefore the Department verifies the expenditure through internal non-published
data, using the published data as an overall check.
There are, in addition, other ways in which the Department is involved in housing
operations.  Funds for grant purposes are disbursed from the Treasury to the
                                                
21 Information is now obtained from alternative sources.
22 FRS 5 has effectively overcome this problem by limiting the situations in which securitised
mortgages can be de-recognised.
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Department and then to the Housing Corporation.  Housing Association accounts
must be sent to the Housing Corporation, for monitoring purposes, whereby the
viability of the association is assessed (usually by reference to the reserves).
Similarly, grants made to the Commission for New Towns, who in turn pass them on
to the individual New Town Development Corporations are subject to the viability of
the receiving organisation as evidenced by their accounts.
Department of Health
The main use the Department of Health has for published accounts is in connection
with the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (1986), which is an agreement
between the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and various
government departments responsible for health matters.  The purpose of the scheme is
to secure the provision of medicines at reasonable prices,  to encourage efficient and
competitive development and supply of medicines, and to encourage a strong and
profitable pharmaceutical industry in the UK capable of sustained research and
development.  The scheme is concerned with the NHS medicines, which are those
brand-named medicines produced by a single supplier.  In the case of generic
pharmaceutical products (non brand names e.g. aspirin) it is felt that competition will
eliminate excessive profits.
Each pharmaceutical company supplying NHS medicine with total home (UK) sales
of over £4 million, has to supply an annual financial return in a prescribed format to
the Department of Health within six months of the end of the accounting year.  This
return consists of disaggregated information on revenue, costs and profits.  It is
accompanied by an independent accountant's report and is reconciled to the published
financial statements. Where a pharmaceutical company is marketing rather than
producing, a separate return is completed, reconciling the audited accounts with the
annual financial return.   A similar breakdown is made of the balance sheet in order to
make a calculation of the return on assets.  There is an acceptable range for this, some
four percentage points wide.   Improved efficiency will increase the return allowed on
assets, and this circumstance is acceptable to the Department.  Adjustments are made
where current costs are used, under the alternative accounting rules permitted by the
Companies Act, as returns are based strictly on historical cost.  Current ratios are used
for comparison purposes between NHS and non NHS products to ensure that
companies are not attempting to  'load' capital employed.  Accounts of overseas
holding companies are also analysed to examine, for example, the ratio of research
and development expenditure to sales to ascertain a reasonable proportion of R & D
expenses for the UK company.
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Medium sized companies (sales of NHS medicines of £400,000 to £4 million), have
to supply a certified breakdown of turnover with the audited accounts, whereas small
companies are exempt from these requirements, although the Department of Health
retains the right of full information disclosure.  With small companies the Department
may query excessive remuneration/benefits for directors and reduce these for
calculation purposes.
There are no rights of access to management accounts or any internal information, but
companies have always adhered to the request for information as laid down.  There
has been no involvement by the Department in standard setting as it feels that the
Agreement is sufficiently comprehensive for their needs.
The Department of Trade and Industry
a) Statistics
The Department of Trade and Industry formerly carried out a company accounts
analysis published regularly by HMSO as Business Monitor MA3 "Company
Finance".  This consisted of a set of standardised and aggregated balance sheets,
income and appropriation accounts and statements of sources and uses of funds
together with various accounting ratios23.  Tables were presented for the Industrial
and Commercial Sector as a whole, and also for some 30 constituent industry groups
based on the UK standard industrial classification of 1980.  In addition to data
collected on the top 2000 companies in the UK, remaining information was based on
a sample of companies.
The contents of companies' profit and loss account had to be adapted to the format of
the income and appropriation accounts recorded in MA3 and additionally, the sources
and uses of funds had to be compiled from a SSAP which allowed a great deal of
latitude in content and presentation.  Since the standardised formats of the 1981
Companies Act were fully adopted, the adaptations have been easier to effect,
although the right for smaller companies to file modified accounts has meant that
there are fewer smaller companies on which to base any sample.
b)  Grants
Formerly, the Department was responsible for overseeing grants given under Section
7/8 of the Industry Act 1972.  Such grants were made in support of the development
of new technology.  In order to check the overhead rate, internal data had to be used;
                                                
23 At the time of the original research, SSAP 10 was extant.
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rights to such data being a condition imposed under the terms of the offer.  Published
accounts would be used as a final check, although this would only tend to be accurate
in the case of a small company, which was involved in a single project.
The involvement of this Department in the standard setting process is covered in a
later section.
Export Credit Guarantee Department24
Although much of the work of the Export Credit Guarantee Department is concerned
with foreign buyers and therefore the assessment of risk based on non-UK
information, there are situations where the Department uses the published financial
information from UK companies.  This would occur where the Department has the
right to claim money back from UK companies under a recourse clause of the ECGD
facility.
Before assuming any contingent liabilities, the Department makes an assessment of
the solvency of the UK exporter in order to judge his ability to meet a recourse
demand.  A simple form of ratio analysis is used to examine trends or adverse features
to identify areas for further investigation.  This may lead to meetings with Finance
Directors and, with the Company's approval, meetings with bankers.  The right to
carry out this course of action may be contained within the guarantee document.  The
acceptance of a contingent liability may be followed by the demand for some form of
guarantee, or in rare cases, the taking of security.  In this way, the Department acts in
the same way as a banker when assessing a contingent liability based on a
performance bond.
There has been no direct involvement by this Department with the standard-setting
process.
Department of Employment
a) Employee Involvement Section
Under Section 1 of the Employment Act of 1982, employers are required to disclose
(a) how employees are informed and (b) what steps are being made towards financial
participation in the firm for employees.  This disclosure has to be made in the
Director's Report.  Where companies fail to comply, they are warned to do so and the
annual report is specifically checked the following year.  Where disclosure is
somewhat vague and generalised, there are no powers to secure further information;
                                                
24  A non-ministerial government department.
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only requests can be made. Companies are selected on a random basis from the Times
Top 1000 and analysed on the basis of numbers of employees rather than industry
types.  It is felt by this Section that the 'voluntary basis' of disclosure will be
maintained. The Section will also use financial reports for the purpose of generally
briefing the Minister in the area of employee involvement.
b) Economic Policy Briefing Section
This section has a function of briefing the Minister on matters relating to specific
companies.  They use the Annual Report rather than the accounts to obtain an
overview of the information about a target company, although there is a particular
emphasis on both the sales and profit figures.  General information disclosure on
employment would tend to be ignored, only positive items would be relevant such as
specific information on employee participation or the involvement of the company
with a local TEC (Training and Enterprise Council).
More information where required may be obtained from other sources, such as the
local Employment Department office or other concerned government departments e.g.
DTI or Department of the Environment, but this information would tend to be
descriptive, rather than quantitative.
There is no direct involvement of this Department in accounting standard setting.
The Home Office
a)   Procurement Section
This unit deals with major areas of purchasing, and establishes a bidders list for major
contracts.  Potential bidders are selected, and if they are interested in proceeding,
three years accounts are forwarded to the Home Office to ensure  their capability in
financial terms of carrying out the contract.  These are then subject to ratio analysis to
ensure their suitability.  If the results are not entirely satisfactory, a parent company
guarantee could be requested.  In situations where there is no parent company, internal
data can be requested to ensure that companies do not agree terms, which are
optimistic in such areas as future cash flows.  Payments on account of supplies are
fairly rare, but where used are normally covered by bank guarantees.
Where a trading relationship already exists, and suspicion about the supplier exists,
the Home Office would use a commercial agency (Dun and Bradstreet) to check and
report on the status of the company in order to secure the most up to date information.
Certain supplies are considered vital to some Home Office establishments such as
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prisons where interruptions to delivery of material to prison workshops or food could
be critical.  As an adjunct to using commercial agencies, a bank reference may also be
sought in these circumstances.  At the time of the interview, the Home Office was
setting up a management information system to give a profile of supplying companies
so that a more systematic check could be carried out.
External commercial agencies are also used for interpretation of European
Companies'  accounts where, under E C rules for compulsory advertising for tender,
the Home Office has difficulties formulating opinions.
b) Voluntary Services Unit
This unit of the Home Office deals with issues relating to matters concerning the
government and the voluntary sector.  The government perspective arises from their
role as grant givers or managers of contracts with voluntary organisations for the
provision of services.  Direct grants may be given from central or local government or
from other bodies such as the NHS.  Additionally, they may be involved in payment
for either projects or services such as the provision of residential places.
Because of this, they feel that both they (and the public) should have a comprehensive
picture of the various sources of income of the recipient organisations and stress the
importance of distinguishing (and identifying) public sources of funding, in order to
give an indication of the financial viability and future prospects of individual
charities.
This is in line with current government thinking on organisational accountability, and
would also fall generally in the area of public interest, in that direct funding and the
tax relief granted on fund-raising activities can be seen as the grant of a public
benefit.
The only direct submission to the Accounting Standards Committee, during the period
was made by this section in response to an exposure draft on one SORP (Statement of
Recommended Practice).
The Inland Revenue
There was, prior to 1993, no obligation for the corporate taxpayer to submit published
accounts to the Inland Revenue.  Where these were supplied they were forwarded to
the Inland Revenue with tax computations (and/or return of profits).  In the absence of
this, the Revenue had powers to raise an estimated assessment.  Where an appeal was
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made against this, published accounts were normally submitted as part of the appeal
procedure. Cases were sometimes referred by the Revenue to the Commissioners for
appeal in order to secure accounts and computations.  Failing this, there were formal
information powers available under the Taxes Management Act s 51 and s 20. Now,
however, under the 'Pay and File' system, a company is obliged to send a copy of its
accounts to the Inland Revenue with its return within a specified time from the year
end
The preference expressed by the Inland Revenue not unnaturally, was for accounting
standards to be tax-driven.  In this connection, any comments on standards are made
to the Department of Trade and Industry; and therefore cannot be separately attributed
to the Inland Revenue, although one direct comment was made on ED 40 of a highly
technical nature concerning one specific legal case.
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food
This Department is not presently a user of published accounts as grants made to third
parties are on a quantitative basis, and thus concerned with physical production rather
than financial information.
However, the Ministry was previously involved in two schemes, which depended
upon the published accounts of the recipients.  The first of these was an EC (European
Community) scheme for modernising agricultural infrastructure facilities such as
grain storage at docks.  As part of the application procedure,  accounts had to be
submitted for scrutiny to ensure the viability of the recipient company and subsequent
checks were carried out to ensure that moneys had been properly spent.  The second
scheme was the Farm and Horticultural Scheme (later named the Agricultural
Improvement Scheme) under which a grant was made to assist in increasing labour
productivity.  Accounts were used in an attempt to use income figures to check on the
increase in labour productivity.  In many cases, these grants were made to non-
incorporated businesses and there was authorisation for the production of accounts
contained within the Statutory Instrument setting up the scheme.
No direct submissions have been made to the Accounting Standards Committee for
the period in question.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission
The Commission has no power to instigate its own investigations.  These usually arise
from issues referred by the Secretary of State for Industry or the Director-General of
the Office of Fair Trading.  Once an enquiry has been put in hand, the Commission
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has powers to require any person to attend to give evidence or produce any relevant
documents and to require information from any person carrying on any business.
Initially, the Commission asks for management accounts and basic data including
internal performance measures, intragroup trading and transfer pricing  (Brown,
1992). The work of the Commission might be best illustrated by reference to three
specific cases  during the period covered by the research in this paper.
Blue Circle Industries/Armitage Shanks (Cmmd 8039 1980).  Because of Blue
Circle Industries’ policy of creating operating units rather than subsidiaries,  the
Commission recognised that there would be a post-merger information loss.  They
recommended that for some years after the merger, disclosure of the results of the
acquired company (turnover, profits and return on capital),  should be required. Under
the then extant 1967 Companies Act, any analysis of types of business was to be
based on a classification decided by the Directors.  The report suggested that the
classification should be that used by the Board of Trade (Standard Industrial
Classification), and extended to include information on return on capital.
Ford Motor Company (Cmnd 9437 1985).  The company was referred under S. 310
of the Competition Act 1980, forcing Ford to justify its’ pricing policy for spare parts.
For this exercise, product development costs were used from the published accounts,
and an attempt by Ford was made to allocate these costs to that part of the business
dealing with replacement parts.
The Supply of Petrol (Cm 972 1990).  The major petrol wholesalers were asked to
identify all sources of income from site operations and all types of costs directly
arising from ownership of retail sites.  In order to report, the Commission used
published accounts, questionnaires on financial matters and other information
supplied by individual firms and their consultants.
No direct submissions to the Accounting Standards Committee were made  by the
Commission during this period.
Ministry of Defence
a)    Directorate of Procurement
This department uses published accounts, brokers reports and MOD internal records
in order to monitor defence contractors.  The Directorate deals only with macro
issues, such as advising the Office of Fair Trading and the Monopolies and Mergers
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Commission25. There is also a role in briefing the Minister of Defence on specific
companies and projects, in which context the published accounts are used to provide
an overview of activities.
b)    Accounting, Estimating and Pricing Services
This division consists of both accountants and engineers. For non-competitive
contracts, engineers are involved with prime cost and accountants with overheads and
profit rates.  The rate of return on contracts is based on an agreed formula using
capital employed and cost of production.  These rates are agreed by the Review Board
for Government Contracts which was established following agreement between the
Government and the CBI, in order to ensure a rate of return equal to the overall
average earned by British Industry.  This requires a detailed definition of capital
employed, which is given by the Review Board and is computed partly using current
cost information as a basis.
Under their standard conditions of contract, the Ministry of Defence may examine
overheads of contractors and indeed carry out post-costing exercises on selected
contracts.  Published accounts are used as a guide to the financial health of an existing
contractor or a first time bidder for government contracts.  With smaller companies,
published accounts may be useful where the company is involved in one unit of
production, but only as a device for checking costs.  In the case of larger companies,
segmental results would not be of use because the data would not be presented for the
production unit.   For the purpose of pricing, the unit may be very small in
comparison to the firm as a whole.  Internal data supplied under the standard
conditions is reconciled, where possible with the published accounts as a check on
accuracy, and any consolidation adjustments are carefully examined.
The Ministry has not made any direct submissions to the Accounting Standards
Committee in the period under examination.
Office of Fair Trading
The Office of Fair Trading is a non-ministerial department with close links (through
personnel) with the DTI.  The main areas of responsibility are investigation into
restrictive trade practices, anti-competitive practices, monopolies and mergers.  Work
in the area of restrictive trade practices involves the examination of such areas as
cartels e.g. product pricing, with the view of detection of super-normal profits.
                                                
25  For an example, see the GEC/Siemens proposed take-over of Plessey (Cm 676, April 1989).
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In the case of anti-competitive practices, investigations are carried out in such areas as
predatory pricing (the short-term reduction in prices to drive out competition).  The
Office examines internal data to see if, for example price is less than marginal cost. If
requested information is not forthcoming, the Office may commence a formal
investigation.  Statutory powers for securing the necessary information are held under
the Competition Act (1980).  In the case of mergers, the Office examines the prior
profitability of the target company and also the consideration paid for the company.
As a preliminary test, this is compared with the replacement costs of the assets (if
known) to ascertain the reason for the purchase i.e. is it a purchase of assets or
purchase of market share?  Powers to secure information are held rather vaguely
under the terms of the Fair Trading Act of 1973, with S 22 giving the rights to 'collect
information'.
The Office claims to make its’ own submissions to the ASC and comments were
submitted on ED 45 (Segmental Accounting) which they supported as  super-normal
profits would be highlighted and thus new entrants attracted to the market.  The
Office has indicated that it would support the disclosure of replacement cost
accounting information in a reply to any exposure draft on fixed asset accounting.
This would assist it to carry out its functions in the areas of anti-competitive practices
and mergers.
The Treasury
The role of the Treasury is that of management of the UK economy, and as such, they
do not appear to have an interest in the accounting statements of any one firm.  Their
representation on the ASC and the ASB is that of an observer, although in this role,
they are also invited to comment.
They view their role in two ways; firstly to look at commercial standards and their
applicability to government agency accounting and government commercial
enterprises e.g. HMSO. Secondly they look at the wider economic implications of
standards, although it is not possible to ascertain whether they passively identify such
implications or attempt to control, or recommend action to overcome those effects
which they consider undesirable or incompatible with current policy. Any comments
made on accounting regulation would go through the Department of Trade and
Industry, or if made direct would have already been discussed with that Department,
although in the ten years examined no exposure draft replies have been made directly
by the Treasury.
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H M Customs and Excise - VAT Section
The general use of published accounts is as a 'range check' of values put into VAT
returns.  In performing this function, accounts are more valuable in the context of
output (sales) than input (purchases), as the latter will include wages and other items
not subject to taxation. Additionally, tax on the purchase of fixed assets would not
show up in the profit and loss account26.
Rights to inspect documents, records and information generally, are held under the
VAT Act 1983, which reduces the importance of using published accounts as a prime
source of information.  However, due to limited investigative resources, published
accounts do, in fact give an overview of where such resources are best employed.
Where group accounts are being examined, these can be supplemented by the
inclusion of consolidation working papers.
In the case of insurance companies, the financial accounts are not used so much as the
statutory audited report forwarded to the DTI. This report, by giving a breakdown of
risks and type of business, allows a better range check and information on the nature
of activities.
No replies have been made to Exposure drafts directly by this department.
                                                
26 Although Customs and Excise did admit that detailed profit and loss accounts submitted by smaller
enterprises were of greater assistance.
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GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AS USERS OF PUBLISHED ACCOUNTS
TABLE 1
Department Relationship Type Users of Published Users of other Basis of Supply
Accounts Information By Law Condition of Rel Industry Agreement
Ministry of Defense
Acc. Est. Pricing Trading * * *
E.C.G.D. * * *
Dept. of Health * * *
Home Office-Proc * *
M.A.F.F. Grant * * *
Dept of Environment * * *
Dept. Trade and Ind. * * *
Office of Fair Trad. Monitoring * * *
Monopolies & Merg. * * *
Employment Dept.
Employee Involvmnt. *
Ministry of Defense
Procurement Dir. Overview * *
Employment Dept.
Economic Policy * *
Dept. Trade & Ind. *
Central Stat Office *
Bank of England *
Inland Revenue Taxation * * *
Customs & Excise * * *
2ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT REPLIES TO EXPOSURE DRAFTS 1980 TO 1990
TABLE 2
E.D. No Topic Economic
Policy
Clarification
of detail
UK Law Compliance with
European Law
Int. Acc. Stds More
Disclosure
29 Leasing * * *
30 Goodwill * * *
31 Acq. & Mergers * * *
32 Pension Costs * * * * *
33 Deferred Tax * *
34 Pension Schemes * *
36 Ex. Items  & P.Y.A. * *
37 Depreciation * *
38 Charities * *
40 Stock & L.T.C * * *
41 Res. & Dev * * * *
42 Spec. Purp. Trans *
43 Gvt. Grants * * * *
44 Goodwill * *
45 Segment. Rptg. * * *
46 Rel. Party Trans * *
48 Acq. & Mergers * *
